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have ted z6 t&$ result. Part of the problem ,
is a pxvai~@i~~egal
attitude of deference to :
. &e sdi6ttfic tt&ablishment. This attitude - .
. 2..-1' . undexiiks pe&hng amendments to the
kdemt$u&s of Evidence and pervades the
supra% h r t k decision in Daubert v.
PharmaceuticaZs Inc. and its .
.
e e r a l EZecrtic CQ.v John and
The Co. v. Camtichael, aswe13 as
regunor, Fye v. United States. We d
i fiir k s deferential appmach.
,k summarize the nature of DNA
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and explain the database search
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& cases are &@ER~ in at least one critical
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p@~confimt.imiawe," other evidence has
H e the d e f e n e t a suspect and so warranted testing l$isDNA. In the Mher, what
we HiH call the.%wl case," the DNA
match itself made tee defendant a suspect,
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case has been the model for most uses of
DNA evidence up to now. But the recent
creation of a national database containing
profiles of past offenders means that the
trawl case will become increasingly irnportant over the coming years.
Next, we discuss the NRCs analyses of
the question of whether and how the DNA
evidence should be presented in the trawl
case, and we present our own contrasting
analysis. The first NRC report (NRC I), in
1992, opposed admission of the evidence
altogether. NRC I proposed that a match
&covered after a database search should
provide the basis for performing further
tests on a new sample taken from the suspect identified by the match, but that the
evidence of the initial match should not be
presented to the jury The second NRC
report (NRC 11), issued four years later in
1996, takes a substantially more generous
view, but still calls for a testifying expert to
drast~callyunderstate the value of the evidence.
In our view, the caution reflected in the
NRC reports and in the analyses of those
who have taken a similar perspective on the
problem is unwarranted. The fact that the
DNA match was found only after a search,
possibly of many thousands of samples,
does not diminish the value of the evidence. On the contrary, the fact that other
potentla1 suspects have been eliminated as
possible sources of the crime sample slightly raises the value of the evidence. No
downward adjustment in the force of the
evidence is appropriate. (Indeed, the confirmation case and the trawl case are really
poles of a continuum, and analysis of the
two cases is fundamentally the sarne.) It
may well be that the total weight of the evidence is less in the trawl case than in the
confirmation case; there may be less inculpatory evidence in the trawl case, and the
identification of the defendant in that case
may taint any later-developed evidence by
suggestiveness. But this is an entirely
dderent matter, and one that can be left to
the or*
process of argument to the jury;
it does not require any rules restricting the
force ascribed to the DNA evidence or the
manner in which that evidence is presented.

rounding DNA database searches may skip
to the final portion of this article (which
begins on page 92). There we argue that the
dfficulty manifested by the NRC reports
has arisen in part from the tendency of statisticians to export to the legal context
methods that were developed to assist scientific inquiries and that appear more suitable in that context than in adjudication.
But part of the problem also arises from the
tendency of courts to defer to the scientific
establishment with respect to matters of scientific evidence. We suggest that the solution lies less in a "gatekeeping" role of the
type prescribed by Frye, as well as by
Daubert ,Ioiner, and Kumho, designed to
keep out disreputable expert evidence, and
more in the role of aggressive consumer.
When courts allow experts to present evidence in court, it is to perform a service for
the legal system. The courts should try to
ensure that the experts are doing so in a
way designed to serve the needs of that
system and are not bound by the experts'
own professional habits.

DNA evidence and the
database search problem
To understand the database search problem, it is necessary to understand some
aspects of DNA evidence -but, mercifully,
only some of the less techcal ones.
DNA is a remarkably complex type of
molecule that is sometimes said to contain
the genetic blueprint of life. DNA is contained in the nucleus of virtually all cells of
every living organism. Within a given
organism, the DNA is effectively the same
from cell to cell. The entirety of an individual organism's DNA is referred to as its
genome. In humans, the genome consists of
two collections, one inherited from each
parent, of about three billion building
blocks, called bases. Human DNA is
extremely similar across individuals. This
shared genetic material is what makes us
human and btinguishes us from other life
forms. At a multitude of sites in the
genome, however, there are variations from
one human to another; typically, two unre-

in 1,000. These variations are what y k e
humans genetically d8erent from each
other. Except for identical twins, no two
humans have DNA that is identical
throughout the whole genome.
The consistency of DNA throughout a
given person's body, and the uniqueness of
a given personls DNA, are what mak DNA
evidence so valuable for identification purposes. In determining whether the DNA
from two separate samples comes from the
same person, it is not possible given the
current state of science tocoinpar&them
over the whole genome. Current testing
techniques use several markers. Each marker targets a particular place, or locus, on the
genome. For DNA profiling techniques, loci
are chosen &display considerable variability among individuals. In most current
methodsms variability is manifested by
differences in the length, measured by the
number of bases or the number of times a
given sequence repeats, between pre-specified locations. This procedure will yield two
measurements for each sample for each
locus, one for the father's side and one fo
the mother's side.
If the pair of measurements from one
sample qt a given locus is the sarne as the
pair of measurements from another sample
at that locus, the profiles are said to match
at that locus; otherwise, they are said not to
match at that locus. If the two profiles
match at each of the loci examined, the profiles are said to match. If the profiles fail to
match at one or more loci, then the profiles
do not match, and it is virtually certain
putting aside, as we do throughout this adcle, the possibility of laborato~yerror that the samples do not come from the
same person.
Our concern here is with the case in
which the profiles do match. A match d m
not mean that the two samples must
absolutely have come from the same source;
all that can be said is that, so far as the test
was able to determine, the two samples
were identical, but it is possible for more
than one person to haw the same profile as
inhcated by a test even of several loci. At
any given locus, the percentage of people
having DNA fragments of a given length is

&
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small but not infinitesimal. DNA tests gain
[heir power from the conjunction of matches at each of several loci; it is extremely rare
[or two samples taken from unrelated mdi\iciuals to show such congruence over
many loci.
But just how rare? That question must
be addressed if the strength of the DNA
match is to be assessed. Databases of DNA
samples from various populations have
been collected, and from these it is possible
to estimate how common any p e n fragment length is at a given locus. It is typically assumed that the measurements ylelded
by each of the markers used in forensic
DNA profiling are independent of one
nother. This assumption enables a forensic
cientist to multiply probabilities. This mulcation can yleld 17er)i low estimates of
probability that a p e n innocent person
.om the demographic group described by
e database would have a DNA profile
atching the profile common to both of
ese samples. Figures in the range of one
millions down to one in many billions
are typical of profiling systems now in use.
So far so good; there are complexities
nd controversies in the process we have
escribed, but they are not our concern
ere, and for the most part this process is
y now rather well-accepted. Our concein
with the process by which the matching
ples came to be tested, and the implicas that this has for the value oi the evience and the manner in which it should
DNA can be used to test for identity in
arious contexls in litigation, but we will
cus on the most important setting. A
rime has been conlmitted and a person,
ssertedly the perpetrator, has left a sample
f fluid or tissue containing testable DNA at
e scene of the crime or at some other
ene associated with the clime. This Same is often known as the "crime sample."
e police lznow that if they find a person
ose DNA matches that of the crime Same they may have round the perpetrator.
OTV we will consider two scenarios by
hich the police might find a match. In
ach scenario, we will call the person whose

The Confirmation Case. In the first scenario, what we will call the confirmation
case, there is a substantial amount of ex<dence pointing to Matcher before his DNA
is even tested. This evidence might include
testimony by a victim of the crime or some
other eyewitness identifying Matcher as the
perpetrator. It might also include a trail of
blood or other circumstantial evidence leading, literally or figuratively, from the crime
to Matcher. In any event, the police, believing that they may have their man, secure a
DNA test of Matclher. Sure enough, the
"suspect sample," as it is often known,
matches the crime sample.
Just how this evidence should be presented is a difficult question. One method
that is widely used, and that at least for present purposes we regard as satisfactory,
states the match pi-obabili~.Ths is the probability that, if nothing were laown about a
person other than that he was a member of
some defined population, his DNA profile
would match that of the cnme sample. This
probability quantifies the rareness of an
"innocent" or "chance" match.
The Trawl Case. In the second scenario
- what we are calling the "trawl case" apart from the crime sample, the police do
not at first have evidence that narrows their
search to one suspect, or even to a few This
might, for instance, be a rape case in whch
the rapist was a stranger to the victim and
was not apprehended immediately after the
crime. But the police do have the crime
sample. And they also have a database containing profiles of DNA samples taken from
a large number of people, one of whom
nziglzt be the perpetrator. Sure enough, the
database search ylelds one profile, and only
one, that matches the crime sample. The
police then try to find further evidence
incriminating the source of that profile,
Matcher, and perhaps they find it. Perhaps,
for example, when Matcher is brought
before the victim, she identifies him as the
perpetrator.
The trawl case will take on increasing
importance m coming years. Development
has been fast in England and \Vales, where
since 1995 DNA profiles have been taken
routinely from. along others, all persons
charged with a "recordable offence." As of

July 2000, nearly 80,000 crime samples
had been matched to profiles in this database and more than 11,000 matches had
been made between samples from different
crimes. I11 the United States, development
of a national database has been much more
complex. I11 part because of the encouragement, including financial incentives, offered
by the DNA Identification Act of 1994, all
50 states now require designated sets of
convicted offenders to provide DNA samples for analysis. The state databases operate in accordance with national quality
assurance standards and software designed
by the FBI and participate in the Combined
DNA Information System (CODIS) maintained by the FBI. Since October 1998, the
FBI has been able to compare the profile of
a DNA sample from a crime scene with all
the profiles in the system. Thus, CODIS
now operates in effect as a national database. As of April 2000, laboratories reported analyzing more than 360,000 offender
profiles for entry into CODIS, with nearly
400,000 more waiting to be analyzed. As of
the same time, CODIS had been responsible for over 600 "hits," assisting in more
than 1,100 investigations. These numbers
will almost certainly increase dramatically
within the next few years.
Over time, one can ima,@e databases
even broader than the current ones; fingerprints are now routinely taken from
arrestees as well as convicts, and from many
persons not suspected of crime, and it is
plausible to suppose that the same will
occur with respect to DNA sanlples.
Indeed, the manager of the English database - which operates under fewer administrative and constitutional constraints than
its counterpart in the United States - has
said he expects that eventually it will
include a third of all English men between
the ages of 16 and 30.
And now we can perceive what we have
called the database search problem. In the
confinmation case, the fact tl~atMatcher's
sample, the only one tested, inatched the
crime sample is clearly powerful evidence
that Matcher was the source of the crime
sample. But in the trawl case. many samples
were tested, without a finger already pointing to ally particular suspect. How does t h s

factor affect the stmmgth of the evidence of
a DNA match? How, if at all, should that
evidence be presented in court? We now
turn to that problem.

Analyzing the database
search problem
The NRC Reports. h NRC I, a
Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic
Science specially appointed by the NRC
said: "The &tinction between finding a
match between an evidence sample and a
suspect sample and finding a match
between an evidence sample and one of
many entries in a DNA profile database is
important. The chance of finding a match
in the second case is considerably higher,
because one does not start with a single
hypothesis to test (i.e., that the evidence
was left by a particular suspect), but instead
fishes through the databank, trying out
many hypotheses."
Thus, the committee pointed out, "[Ilf a
pattern has a frequency of 1 in 10,000,
there would still be a considerable probability (about 10 perrent) of seeing it by chance
in a databank of 1,000 people." The report
recommended a cautious solution: A match
between an "evidence sample" -what we
are calling the crime sample - and a profile in a database "should be used only as
the basis for further testing using markers at
additional loci." That is, evidence of the initial match should be deemed "probable
causenfor securing a blood sample from the
person so identified, and comparing it with
the evidence sample using markers that
were not used in the initial test. What is
more, if the second test indicates that the
two samples match, "only the statistical frequency associated with the additional loci
should be presented at trial (to prevent the
selection bias that is mherent in searching a
databank)."
NRC I1 offered an analysis of the database search problem that was quite simdar
to that of NRC I, but recommended a substanually more lenient solution. (Actually, as
we explain in our longer Michigan Law
Review article, NRC I1 offered two somewhat drfferent analyses; we concentrate here

on the anal* to which NRC I1 gave prirnacy) According to NRC 11, an "imponant
diffemce," a difference of a "logical!'-nature.
between the c o ~ t i o case
n and the
aawl uw is illustrated by this simple set bf
statistical hcts:
It
"[I]f we toss 20reputedly unbiased coins
once each, there is roughly one chance
in a million that all 2 0 . d show heads.
According to standard statistical logic,
the occurrence of tlm l-ughly unlikely
event would be regarded as evidence
discrediting the hypothesis that the coins
are unbiased. But if we repeat this experiment of 20 tosses a large enough number of times, there d l be a high prob'ability that all 20 coins will show heads in
at least one experiment. In that case, an
event of 20 heads would not be unusual
and would not in itself be judged as evidence that the coins are biased."
Further, contended the report, "[t]he initlal identification of a suspect through a
search of a DNA database is analogous to
performing the coin-toss experiment rnany
times: A match by chance alone is more
likely the larger the number of p r o h
examined."
t
Essential to NRC 11, therefore, is the perception that the more profiles examined,
the less probative the evidence. And NRC I1
recommends how this supposedly diminished probative value ought to be communicated to the jury As we have indicated
above, an expert may tesufy as to the pmbability that a sample taken from an arbitrarily chosen member of the relevant population would match the crime sample. In
determining that probabty, NRC I1 provides, the expert should take the probability
that she would USR if only one sample were
compared to the clime sample, as in the
confirmation case, and then multiply that
probability by the number of profiles in the
searched database. If there are hundreds of
thousands or even millions of profiles in the
database, this adjustment may make what
appeared to be an implausible chance of a
coinci&nt.al match -b l a s e the probability was so low -seem m be far more
substantial. The DNA A d W q board of the

.
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FBI has endorsed this appmach.
Thus, though tbe NRC reports &&r in
their ultimate recmendations, their
analyses ok the database senreh problem are
very sirmlar. We believe that these a n a l p ,
and those of scholars who have supporked
the NRC approach, are clearly wronp We
can~otshow here all the anomalies df
NRC approach that we discuss in our
longer article. But we will say ahugh m
show that the NRC approach asks the
wrong question, arid that it fails to mqnize the full import of evidence of idem%cation based on a d a t a b qbrch.
~
Our v i ~The
. p r o ~ eview of the situation reflects a rather simple intuition. The
valueof a DNA match is attributable to the
rarity of the profile. If the DNA of a particular person matches the crime sample, that
evidence stmngly supports the proposition
that that person was the source of the crime
sampEthat is, the evidence makes that
appear far more probable tban
it did before the match was known.. That
other sarqples have been tested and found
not to match does not weaken the probative
value of the match, with respect to this partinnlar proposition, which is the one of ~IWest at the time of trial. On the contrary, t k i
result somewhat strengthens the prob~dve
valuqof the match, because it elirnu&tes
some other persons as potential sources.
How probable it appean that the particular
person is the source depends not only on
the DNA evidence but also on the other evidence inl the case. If there is no other evidence pointing to kum,then the proposition
will not appear as ldcely as if there were
such evidence -not beduse the DNA evidence is any less valuable, but because the
prior probability of the proposition is so
low. And evidence found after the DNA
match is determined might be subject to a
ground of skepticism -the possibhty of
suggestiveness created by the match itself
-not applicable to evidence found beforehand. Thus, the probability that the dcfendant is the source of the crime sample may
well appear less in the trawl case than in
the confirmation case, but t b is not
because the DNA evidence itself is any
weaker in the trawl case.

Both NRC I and NRC I1 emphasized
that, as the number of profiles tested
increases, so too does the probability of
finding a match w i ~ hthe crime sample.
That is indisputably true. One can even say
that the larger a database is the more likely
it is that the da~abasewill yield at least one
false positive result - a profile that matches the crime scene sample but that does not
come from the source of that sample. But
the conclusion that the NRC reports draw is
that the larger a database is (up to a point)
the less valuable is evidence that a database
trawl ylelded a single match. Here the NRC
and its supporters go wrong.
The proposition that the DNA evidence
s offered to prove is not the broad one that
he source of the ciime sample is a person
epresented in the database. Rather, it is
hat one particular person - the de$endant in
he case at Izand -is tlze soLtrce of that
alnple. And the evidence bearing on this
roposition is not simply that there was one
atcli within the database. Rather, it is that
e DNA oJ that partic~tlnrperson - alone o j
11 tlzose tested - nzatches tlze cliilze sample.
Now consider in addition the fact that
ther samples have in fact been tested and
ound not to match the crime sample. With
espect to the precise proposition at issue
that Matcher is the source of the crime
mple - this fact can only enlzance, not
iminish, the probative value of the DNA
vidence. One reason for this is that the
dditional information that a significant
ber of persons have been tested and
d not to match the crime sample can
make the profile of that sample appear
than it did absent that inforn-~ation.
otentially more important, a number of
eople other than the defendant who previusly appeared to be possible sources of the
lime sample have now been eliminated,
US inalzing each ol the remaining possibils somewhat more probable. Assuining,
1s usually the case, that the size of the
atabase is veiy small in comparison to the
pect population, this effect will be neglile, but as the size of the database
lcreases in compaiison to that population,

the effect becomes dominant. If the database includes the entire suspect population,
then the existence of only one match points
the finger without doubt (assuming accurate testing) at the person so identified. This
fact alone, that the all-inclusive database
makes the existence of one match essentially conclusive evidence, shows that the NRC
analysis, which treats the DNA evidence as
less valuable the more profiles are in the
database, must be mistaken.
The point may be made even clearer by
considering an analogy that draws the
NRC's hypothetical involving repeated coin
flips closer to the reality of DNA testing.
Suppose one coin !mown to be biased, but
otherwise indistinguishable from all those
in a piggybank, is thrown into the bank. A
tester picks from the bank at random a
handful of coins and h p s each of them 20
times. Each lands heads up approximately
10 times except for one coin that shows
heads on all 20 flips. These results are powerful, though not conclusir~e,evidence that
this one coin is the biased coin that was
thrown into the bank. Just how powerful
the evidence is depends on how common
biased coins are believed to be in the bank.
But two points seem utterly clear: The evidence that the one 20-heads-up coin is the
biased one thrown into the bank is made
stronger, not less strong, by the fact that
other coins were tried and appeared to be
unbiased, and the more other coins [hat are
tested, the stronger the evidence is.
Thus, the DNA evidence itself is 112ore,
not less probative the more profiles have
been searched. Nevertheless, given the same
DNA match, the entire Zlodji qf evidence may
well be stronger in a typical confirmation
case than in a trawl case, which involves
many searches. There at least ~ w oreasons
\vl-~ythis is so.
First, by definition, in the confirmation
case there is enough evidence independent
of the DNA evidence to cast strong suspicion on the eventual defendant. By definition, [hat is not tme before the da~abase
search in the trawl case, and it may noL be
i may well be that,
true even after. And L
even after Lhe trawl identifies the defendan~
as having DNA inatching [hat or the ciime
sample, there is little or no other evidence

tending to suggest that he is the perpetrator
of the crime. Assuming that this is true, and
that the database searched in the trawl case
was not very large in proportion to the suspect population, the entire body of evidence will plainly be stronger in the confirmation case than in the trawl case. Of
course, it may still be strong enough in the
trawl case to warrant conviction.
Second, even if the evidence in the two
cases, the non-DNA evidence as well as the
DNA evidence, is comparable, it may
appear to have greater weight in the confirmation case than in the trawl case. Suppose
that in the confirmation case the police
compile a powerful case against Matcher,
based on circumstantial evidence and eyewitness identification, and only at the end
of their investigation conduct the DNA test.
And suppose that in the trawl case the
police, having identified Matcher as a suspect only through a database search, focus
their inquiries wi1l-I such success that they
are able to compile the same circumstantial
and eyewitness identification evidence. In
such a case, it xnay be plausible that the
subsequently discovered evidence was tainted by suggestiveness,gven that the DNA
match motivated the police, and possibly
witnesses as ~vell,to confirnl the suggestion
that the perpetrator had been found.
These possibilities mean that the confirmation and trawl cases will not necessarily
look the same, even assuming that the DNA
evidence in the two is of a match with the
same profile. But these are factors that a
jury, aided by the arguments of counsel, can
easily take into account. It is not hard, for
example, for a defense attoiney to argue,
"Escep~for t h s DNA evidence, the prosecution does not have a shred of evidence
against my client. And the prosecutor's akin
es~ei-tacknowledged that there could well
be several other people in the world with
the same DNA." Similarly defense counsel
could argue, "The police and the eyewitnesses were hun,gy to find the perpetrator.
After they got this DNA match, naturally
they constructed a case to fit the hypothesis
01 my client's guilt." No technical es~ertise
is necessary to make ihese arguments, and

no adjustment in presentation of the DNA
evidence is required.
The two factors discussed above may
account in part for the intuitive sense of
some observers -including the NRC committees -that the probative value of a
DNA match is weakened by the fact that it
is found after a database search. But in fact,
as we have argued, it is not that the DNA
evidence is weakened; rather, it is possible
that the other evidence in the case tends to
be weaker if, and to some extent because,
identification from a database trawl has led
to it.

The aspiration to objectivity
We believe there are also deeper reasons
for the NRC enors, and for the wihgness
of legal players to adopt those errors. We
believe that some habits of statisticians and
scientists make them prone to errors of this
sort, and that a judicial tendency towards
deference diminishes the ability of courts to
make good use of scientific and statistical
evidence.
Science aspires to objectivity, to the
demonstration of propositions that are not
dependent on the subjective views of the
observer. Accordingly, it is highly dependent on experiments in which given sets of
conditions are observed many times. By
counting or measuring different consequences in different condtions, a scientist
can hope to draw conclusions on the associations between conditions and consequences.
Accordingly, classical statistics grew up
to facilitate objective inferences from data.
Classical statisticians try to avoid subjective
judgments, seekmg instead to determine
what conclusions can be drawn solely on
the basis of frequency of observation. The
Bayesian approach -updating the odds
assigned to a given proposition in light of
evidence subsequently received -is thus
unacceptable to classical statisticians
because it depends on the subjective assignment of odds in the absence of objectively
measurable data. Instead, the classical statistician, having selected a hypothesis t~ be
tested but without having assigned any

probability to that proposition, observes
whether the results of an experiment are of
a h i d y unusual nature assuming the m t h
of that proposition. If they are, then the sta- .
tisticiarl concludes that the hypothesis ean
be rejected. Under this approach, great caution must be exexised in testing more than
one hypothesis ~imuli'aneousl~
became the
more observations pmade the more likely
it becomes that some will be ;unusual even
though n o h g remarkable happened.
The NRC approach clearly reflects
classical method. NRC I emphasized
with a database trawl "one does not start
with a single hypothesis to test (i.e., that the
evidence was left by a particular suspect),
but instead fishes through the databank,
tryrng out many hypotheses." Thus, no conclusion could be drawn from the fact of a
match produced by the trawl; instead, the
match "should be used only as the basis for
further testing using markers at additional
loci." In other words, the initial match
yielded by the search identifies the hypothesis to be tested, and nothing more.
Though NRC I1 did not recommend the
'
same solution, its analysis of the problem
was very similar. Recall NRC II's discussion
of an experiment in which 20 coins are tossed in the air repeatedly and eventudly
they come up all heads. Applying the
lessons of "standard statistical logic," NRC I1 '
said that this experiment proves nothing,
because given enough trials it is unsurprising that some of them will have unusual
results. And this analogy, N K I1 maintained, was on point for the database search
problem, because the more profiles
searched -the more hypotheses tested the greater the chance of flnding one that
matches the crime sample purely by coincidence.
The NRC seems not to have recognized
how different the enterprise of law is fiom
the scientific enterprise for which the classical statistical model was developed. The
problem facing an investigator or a juror is
not to determine a general law of the uniI

+

verse. Rather, the inm-tcxr
determime who c ~ ~ e a ae d
a giMn occasi~n;the )mi%
rower, seeking to detamhe
given pemn; on wham its ambeen focused, committe
Sub$ctiVe assessment, in

- .-

a conclusion, or that it wants to p
experiment trmxertain the facts. I
make itsbest assessment of the
basis of,the mfon-ption w i h
Thus,where the evidence ten
that the person who left a p
sample at a particular place
perpetrator, it becomes of imp0
jury whether the defendant is the s
that sample.'-Thejury should
likely the DNA evidence wou
defendant were the sounce to
would arise if he were not the so
the jury should combine these
with its subjective a s ~ e ~ s ~ eofhall
t s I%@'
other evidence in the case to mess tlae:
probability of guilt.
We have, we t h k , shown
cians are prone in a trawl c
the adjudicative system with
the wrong question. But why does
system appear to be ~eadyto actep
advice? The answer, we believe, lies
longstanding tendency of the a
system to defer to the scientifi
ment.
Courts have long been afraid that
will fall prey to "junk sciknce."
have dkmanded that an expert
opinion be in accordance with a theory ehrt
has aheved some threshold level af repc
utability For most of thC 20th century, the
dominant statement of this idea was the

fhe

one inFrye x United Sbtes, 293 E, D.C.Cir.
1923, hat the underlying " s c i d c principle or dkcway . . . h
z
f
iwhich the deduc&isheed
tion is made must be & d y
to have @g e n d aceepfmce in the
particular field in which it belong."
Some @atad l adhere to the Frye test.
But many jurisdictions have Jzlsnfiably
come to the mdwion that its demand for
"general acceptancenby the relevant sciantific community as a peandition to
admissibility is too stringnt. Federal Rule
of Evidence 702, which has beem adopted
in many states, supports this view The Rule
provides:

I
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"If scienti£k,-technical, or other speoalized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skdl,
experience, training, or education, may
tesdy thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise."
In 1993, in Daubert v. M d l Dow
Pharmd~eutica2sInc., 509 U.S. 579, the U.S.
Supreme Court held unanimously that the
"austere standardnof Frye is incompatible
not only with the language 'bf Rule 702 but
also with the liberal nature of the bles in
general. A majority of the Court went
beyond this mhg, however, and attempted
to articulate the "gatekeeping role" that the
judge must play when "[flacedwith a proffer of expert scientdic testimony."
Justice BlackmunS opinion for the
majority expressly limited this discussion to
evidence based on scientific knowledge, as
opposed to "t&cal,
or other specialized
knpwledge," because that was the nature of
the expertise offered in Daubert itself.
Justice Bladrmun put great emphasis on
Rule 7025 use of the tenn kientific . . .
knowledge" and operated h m the premise
that, .ts q u a Q as scientific knowledge, "an
inference or assertion must be derived by
the scientific method." Thus, he attempted
to articulate indicia of the scientific method,
and he laid out four criteria that should
often enter into determining "the scientific
validity" of the principles underlying the
evidence. The+ may be referred to as (1)

testing, (2) peer review and pubbtim (3)
error rates and standads, mrd -p a M y
resumcting Frye just a few pages after its
apparent death -(4) g e m 1 - p w .
Our concern here is not mu& with
the much-debyd q u e s of~ whether
~
Daub& reflects good philoowphy of science,
or even whether it reficts p a d evidpolicy Rather, the point of sigmfirwce here
is that, though D d e r t reflects a loosening
of the demands purportedly applied under
Frye, it still re£lects a notable attitude of cleference to the scientific estabkhment. (And
this is an attitude thaz will be entrenched by
pending amendments to Rule 702,whhr
barring unforseen intervention by Congress
will become effective December 1of h i s
year and wdl explicitly require the court to
determine whether +ert testimony is "the
pmduct of reliable principles and methods
. . . applied . . . reliably to the facts of the
case.") T ~ attitude
E
is apparent in several
respects. Most obviously perhaps, is the
continued use of "general acceptance" as a
criterion -albeit no longer the exclusive
one -for determining a d ~ ~ t y
Further, the other criteria constimte an
adoption of currently prevalent scientific
methods; the emphasis on peer review and
publication also d e s heavily on the attitudes of, and decisions made by the scientific establishment. Perhaps most fundamentally, the entire inquiry seems gratuitous. Under the language of Rule 702,
notlung seems to depend on whether the
knowledge on which the opinion is based is
"scientificnor not. "[Slcientific" and "technical" are clearly listed merely as illustlrations
of "specialized knowledge"; the key question seems to be whether the opinion is
based on "specialized knowledge [that] widl
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."
The bite of Daubertb insistence on scient&c methods was demonstrated in Genelrctl
Electric Co. v.Jainer, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
There, the plainiff attempted to show that
exposure to PCBs, a class of chemicals,

could promote cancer. He presented the
results of four studies, each of which failed
on its own to provide stmng support for
tlus condusion. One of his experts, a toxicolog~~t
named David Teitelbaum, testified
-somewhat ungrammatically,but comprehensibly enough - at a deposition:
"[Als a toxicologist when I look at a
study, I am going to reqyire that that
study meet the general criteria for
methodology and statistical analysis, but
that when all of that data is collected
and you ask me as a patient, 'Doctor,
have I got a risk of getting cancer from
this?'That those s t u d s don't answer the
question, that I have to put them all
together in my mind and look at them
in relation to eveI know about
the substance and everydung I know
about the exposure and come to a conclusion. I think when I say 'To a reasonable m e d a l probabdity as a m e k a l , '
toxicologist, thzs substance was a contributing cause . . . to hts cancer,' that
that is a valid conclusion based on the
totahty of the evidence presented to me.
And I t h d &at that is an appropriate
thing for a toxicologist to do, and it has
been the basis of diagnosis for several
hundred years, anywayn
Justice Stevens agreed with Dr.
Teitelbaum that [i]t is not intrinsically
'unscientific' for experienced professionals
to arrive at a conclusion by weighmg all
available scientific evidence -h s is not
the sort of 'junk science' with whch
Daubert was concerned." But Justice Stevens
stood alone. The rest of the Court upheld
the trial court's decision that expert opinions like this one &d not rise above "subjective belief or unsupported speculation."
A trial court, concluded the majority could
validly decide to exclude "evidence which is
connected to existing data only by the ipse
dixit of the expert. A court may conclude
that there is simply too great an analytical
gap between the data and the opinion
proffered."
"

The fear of junk science -the concern
that juries will be overwhelmed by hcanery hasqueradmg as science has thus
exerted a powerful effect on the American
courts.' And perhaps a fear of their own
inadequacy to separate the wheat p m the
chaff has left them to rely grealy on the
attitudes and metha& of the scientific
establishment. We do not mean to deny
that a "gatekeepingrole" for the courts is
necessary; we assume that some evidence
offered under the guise of science is of so
little value, and sufficient prejudicial potential, that exclusion is warranted. But we
believe that deference to the scientific estabhhment in an attempt to fend off junk science may create another problem -failure
to recognize the extent to wluch, as we
have suggested, the methods ordinarily
used by scientists do not match up with the
needs of the legal system.
The Joiner majority's castigation of the
toxicologist's qpinion as "subjective belief'
reflects shis failure. Adjudication, we have
argued, depends on subjective assessments
of factual issues, and courts are fooling
themselves if they pretend otherwise.
Sometimes, scientists can present to the
jury generalized propositions of the type
that they try to demonstrate in their oqdnary non-forensic work. But adjudication
usually depends on the particulars of the
case at hand.
Often hs means that the law needs to
decide non-recunent matters for which,
because it is impossible to run a controlled
experiment or even to gather data across
like cases, the scientific method d be useless. And yet, in such cases scientifically
based information may be useful in trying
to determine the facts. The subjective belief
of an expert who has had extensive experience in d h g with problems of a roughly
similar nature may be particularly useful ig
bridging the gap between those principles

-

plld tht available ovidmcz Thisia.pfm@

~,fmemmp~~inpseshwhi&
engineer offen an e q h ~ t i o hfar rn atxi*
dent that is s h r in some q e c d
other accidents but unique insane
respects. Even if the experts opinion is an
wel'1"grounded on scientific pincplees, her

observations and judgment, basedl on
extensive experience, m y be8usefjd.*For
this reason, we find the ColurtS dedbion in
Kumho Tirt Co. v. Cannichuel, 526 U.S.137
(!999), somewhat curious. 'She expert r,atS
mony offekd there -that of an expen om
tire failure -was clearly n t scipxiiic. But
the Court held that the ~ ajud&
l had not
abused hts discretion ih applying the
Daubert .criteria. To the extent that judges
apply those criteria in determining the
admissibility of evidence that does ndt evm
purport to bescientific, Kumho wilI represent a further, and misguided, incursion by
science,@o the realm of law. Fortunately1
and appropfiatelfi the Court emphasized
that the Daubeft criteria are not mandatay
on the tnal c$mrt -even with respect to
purportedly scientific evidence.
Even if the matter on which an expert
wishes to offer an opinion is a recurrent
one, so that science can in time yield w
answer with confidence, science may nat be
ready to,do so before h e legal 'iystem needs
guidance. U d k e scientific inquiry, Justice
Blackmun pointed out in D#ubert, law
"must resolve hputes finally and quickly";
evidentiary rules are "designed not-for the
exhaustive search for cosmic understa~~dm
but for the particuhzed resolution dl&
disputes." But the Court seems to ~ V E
failed to realire the imPlica& of
perspective. It does not weigh in favor af
excluding sciennfk evidence, or af & f a g
to the scientific establishmeit,but m k in
favor of recognizing that the law must satisfy its own needs for scientific advice, even if
dolng so does not square with t h e . u d
methods of scientists.
.
In apy case, if a scientist is damg mmrr:
than reciting general principles withbut an
attempt to relate them to the facts of the
case, the lawS treatment of scientific evidence must take into account the adjudi~ative context in whch the evidence is
offered. That context difleqs sigdicantly
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(r,-m
the one in which scientists are used to
\\r,,rIilng -- most notably with respect to
c\lci,:nce of a DNA database search, in that
tb:. ~ury'sjob is at base a subjective one and
In that thc brinpng of the case tends to
dchnc the propositions at issue.
Our perspective may perhaps be crystal\,zed by comparing it to that of Anders
Stocl;marr, one of the statisticians who has
untttn in support of the NRC approach to
the DNA database search problem. "The
decision problem of the court," he has written, "should take the implications of statistical h)potheses for data descnption into
mount, and not the other way around." In
our \iew, this is precisely wrong. The legal
system is a consumer of the information
offered by expert witnesses. It may be that
the senice needed by the legal system
requires scientists to operate in ways at variance with their usual operating methods.
The law should not be a passive consumer
of scientifically based information, taking
what scientists have to offer "off the rack."
Rqthcr, it should be an aggressive consumer,
asking its suppliers to provide what it
needs.
This perspective, which has sometimes
been apparent in debates concerning psychiatric testimony, may be helpful across
the range of expert testimony What the law
needs is not necessanly information
processed in the usual ways of science, but
rather information that will be helpful to
the jurors in making their best subjective
assessment of the particular issues at stake
in the case at hand. Of course, like any consumer, the law can only ask the supplier to
provide what the supplier can. But in the
implicit negotiation between law and science, the law has one advantage that most
consumers do not have: It sets the rules.
The courts should reco~nizethat what they
need from science is not the usual output of
the scientific community, but rather a speclal product more tailored to adjudicative
neecis. Then they may better play the role of
awessi\re consumer, and so better secure
inlormation thdt will be of help to the trier
of f2ct.
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